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 Theoretical Approaches to the Measurement of Income and Social Polarization 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades, we have witnessed a growing interest in the 
conceptualization and measurement of polarization. This interest can be partly 
attributable to the existing relationship between polarization, socio-economic stability 
and economic growth. Loosely speaking, polarization has to do with the clustering of 
individuals forming groups in different parts of a given distribution – particularly in its 
extremes. In politics, a society can be said to become more polarized if their members 
fly away from a moderate ‘center position’ and become more radicalized towards 
opposing and irreconcilable poles. In the case of income distributions, societies 
becomes more polarized when the middle class is hollowed-out and greater proportions 
of individuals fall in the ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ categories. It has been persuasively argued 
elsewhere that the disappearance of the middle class hinders economic mobility and 
economic growth. Moreover, highly polarized societies are more prone to experience 
episodes of social unrest, tension, revolt and even armed conflict.  
For many years, it has been common to relate the origins of social conflictivity with 
high levels of inequality. In this respect, the empirical literature offers – at best – mixed 
and inconclusive evidence. As will be shown in a companion chapter of this volume, 
polarization measures have typically performed better than its inequality counterparts 
when explaining episodes of social tension or conflict. This chapter, however, is of a 
more theoretical and technical nature. Because of space limitations, the measures 
presented in this paper will not be discussed in great depth (the interested reader can 
check the corresponding references for greater detail). Rather, our main goal is to 
provide a wide overview of the different approaches that have been proposed so far in 
the conceptualization and measurement of polarization.  
As it happens with many other terms related to socio-economic phenomena (e.g.: 
‘inequality’, ‘poverty’ or ‘well-being’), the term ‘polarization’ means different things to 
different people. The many and diverse ways in which researchers have tried to 
formalize the intuitions underlying the notion of ‘polarization’ has generated a myriad 
of measures – each of which attempting to approach the same object from different 
angles – that will be explored in this chapter. During the last twenty years or so when 
this literature has been blossoming, it has not been uncommon to see some confusion 
regarding the notions of polarization and inequality because of the close relationship 
existing among them. This is why many contributions to the polarization literature – 
particularly the original ones in the mid 90s – have made strong efforts to establish a 
clear distinction and avoid misunderstandings. As will be seen in this chapter, even if 
the notion of inequality is intimately embedded in the conceptualization of polarization 
and it has been particularly influential in the developments of the later, the two ideas are 
fundamentally different and very often lead to opposing views and results when 
evaluating alternative states of affairs. 
Roughly speaking, most of the contributions to the measurement of polarization can be 
classified under the headings of ‘income polarization’ and ‘social polarization’ 
measures. Income polarization indices measure the extent to which individuals are 
clustered around local and antagonistic poles in the income distribution: they will be 
reviewed in section 2. In that section, we will examine the so-called ‘bipolarization’ 
indices and the ‘multipolar’ ones. Clearly, when a particular income polarization index 
is chosen, alternative income distributions will be ranked completely – that is: given any 
couple of distributions the index will be able to establish which one of them is more 
polarized than the other. However, if we use different indices, there may be different 
rankings of the distributions. In this context, it is common to seek for classes of indices 
that produce the same orderings of alternative sets of income distributions. The incipient 
literature on polarization orderings – which is very much related to the literature on 
inequality and poverty orderings – will also be explored in section 2.  
It has been argued that social tension or conflict may be articulated along certain factors 
other than income distributions, like culture or biology. These factors typically include 
ethnicity, race or religion. The measures attempting to capture the notion of polarization 
when the salient characteristic that divides a given society is of that nature can be 
classified under the label of ‘social polarization’. They will be analyzed in section 3. 
Given the fact that social tension can take place along economic and non-economic 
lines, it is also desirable to have polarization measures able to capture both factors 
simultaneously. These are the so-called ‘hybrid polarization’ measures, which will be 
described in section 4. Lastly, section 5 is devoted to future research lines that need to 
be further investigated.  
Throughout this chapter, we will use the following general notation. A polarization 
index will be denoted with the letter ‘P’ and the corresponding sub-index and super-
index. The super-index will typically be an acronym with the first letter of the author(s)’ 
last name and the sub-index will indicate the kind of index we will be referring to. More 
specifically, PI will denote an income polarization index, PS a social polarization index, 
PH a hybrid polarization index and PM a multidimensional polarization index. 
 
2. Income Polarization Measures 
As many other subfields in welfare analysis, the first polarization measures introduced 
in the literature were primarily interested in the distribution of income across the 
population. This section will be devoted to explore the different income polarization 
measures that have been proposed so far. For that purpose we need to introduce some 
notation. For a population of size N, an income distribution will be given by a pair      
(n, y), where y = (y1,…, yk) is the vector of different income levels and n = (n1,…, nk) is 
the vector of corresponding population sizes (i.e.: ni is the number of individuals with 
income exactly equal to yi). Clearly, Nni i =∑ . Defining 
 
π i := ni N , π =(π1,…, πk) is 
the vector of corresponding population shares. It is assumed that each yi belongs to a 
right-open interval of the real line R1:
 
),[ +∞a  with a ≥ 0. The set of income 
distributions for such population will be denoted by D. For any (n, y)
 
∈D, the mean and 
the median will be denoted by μ(n, y) and m(n, y) respectively (or μ, m for short). We 
will denote by 1k the k-coordinated vector of ones. Assuming that the yi’s are ordered 
non-decreasingly, we denote by yU (resp. yL) the vector of such yi’s above (resp. below) 
the median m. The expressions μU
 
and μL
 
will be used to denote the mean values of the 
numbers in yU and yL  respectively. 
An income polarization index is defined as a real-valued function PI:D →  R1. For all    
(n, y)
 
∈D, the value PI (n, y) indicates the level of polarization corresponding to the 
distribution (n, y).  
Income polarization indices can be classified in two subgroups: the so-called 
‘bipolarization’ indices (the ones that basically measure the extent to which an income 
distribution is clustered around the ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ poles) and ‘multipolar’ indices (the 
ones that measure the extent to which an income distribution has an arbitrary number of 
antagonistic poles). Before exploring the corresponding indices that have been proposed 
in the literature (see below) we will briefly examine their normative foundations, that is: 
the axiomatic properties upon which they are based. Some of these axioms apply for 
both ‘bipolarization’ indices and ‘multipolar’ ones, but some of them are group-specific. 
The most basic axioms are the following ones: 
Normalization: If (n, y)
 
∈D is such that there exists j
 
∈{1,…,k} with nj = N, then          
PI (n, y) = 0.  
Scale invariance: For all (n, y)
 
∈D and all scalars λ > 0, PI (n, y) = PI (n, λy). 
Translation invariance: For all (n, y)
 
∈D and all scalars λ > 0, PI (n, y) = PI (n, y+λ1k). 
Symmetry: For all (n, y)
 
∈D, PI (n, y) = PI (nΠ, yΠ), where Π is any kk ×  permutation 
matrix. 
Population Principle: For all (n, y)
 
∈D,  PI (n, y) = PI (λn, y), where λ > 0. 
Continuity: PI  is a continuous function in its arguments. 
These axioms are so mild that they are not able to pin down a specific polarization 
index. As a matter of fact they are so general that they have also been applied with 
minor modifications when characterizing inequality or poverty indices, so they will not 
be discussed here. The following two axioms are the cornerstones upon which income 
bipolarization measures are based. 
Increased spread: Consider any (n, y)
 
∈D and (n, x)
 
∈D such that m(n, y) = m(n, x) = 
m. Consider the following scenarios: (i) There exists j
 
∈{1,…,k} such that xj<yj<m and 
xi = yi for all i ≠ j; (ii) There exists l ∈{1,…,k} such that m <yl<xl and xi = yi for all i ≠ l. If either (i), (ii) or both (i) and (ii) are true, then PI (n, x) > PI (n, y). 
This axiom basically states that greater distancing between the groups below and above 
the median should make the distribution more polarized (see Figure 1).   
[[[Figure 1 around here]]] 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of ‘Increasing Spread’. 
Increased bipolarity: Consider any (n, y)
 
∈D and (n, x)
 
∈D such that m(n, y) =       
m(n, x) = m. Consider the following scenarios: (i) x has been obtained from y by a 
progressive transfer of income from richer person ‘b’ to poorer person ‘a’ with yb<m; 
(ii) x has been obtained from y by a progressive transfer of income from richer person 
‘d’ to poorer person ‘c’ with yc>m. If either (i), (ii) or both (i) and (ii) are true, then      
PI (n, x) > PI (n, y). 
Increased bipolarity is a clustering or bunching principle. It basically states that when 
egalitarian transfers between individuals on the same side of the median take place, 
polarization should increase (see Figure 2). This axiom is what essentially distinguishes 
polarization from inequality. While all inequality measures satisfying the Pigou-Dalton 
transfers principle would decrease after the transfer, Increased Bipolarity states that 
polarization should increase.  
[[[Figure 2 around here]]] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of ‘Increased Bipolarity’. 
With these and other similar axioms, different authors have characterized some of the 
income bipolarization measures we will now review. 
 
2.1. Income bipolarization measures 
The first bipolarization measures were proposed in Foster and Wolfson (1992) and later 
used in Wolfson (1994, 1997). While originally derived from a polarization ordering 
approach (see section 3), the authors proposed the following bipolarization index: 
( )
m
GTP FWI
µ
−=
  
[1] 
where 
 
T = µU − µL( ) µ and G is the relative Gini index. The value of T is known as the 
relative median deviation. When the distribution is symmetric, μ = m, so bipolarization 
simply equals the difference between T and G, which is always non-negative. Foster and 
Wolfson (1992) also showed that FWIP  can be written as        
( )
m
GGP WB
FW
I
µ
−=    [2] 
where GB and GW are the between- and within- group inequality values (as measured 
with the Gini index) in a partitioning of the population in two groups: those above the 
median and those below it1. Equation [2] clearly shows that in some cases, inequality 
and polarization can go in opposite directions: ceteris paribus, a greater level of within 
group inequality raises overall inequality but lowers polarization. The bipolarization 
index  is simple, intuitive and – as will be shown below – it has been generalized 
in different directions. To be sure, it should be pointed out that different authors speak 
about the Wolfson index when referring to FWIP . The indices shown in equations [1] 
and [2] are written in relative terms (i.e.: the expressions between parentheses are 
divided by the mean μ). It is straightforward to obtain their absolute counterparts 
substituting G and T with the absolute Gini and the absolute median deviation 
respectively. 
Another original approach to measure bipolarization was proposed by Wang and Tsui 
(2000), who suggested the following indices. 
r
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where r∈(0,1). The Wang and Tsui indices simply aggregate the deviations of the 
individual incomes from the median when those are measured in absolute or relative 
terms (equations [3] and [4] respectively). Larger values of parameter r give more 
importance to very large deviations from the median.  
Extensions 
                                                          
1Since these two subgroups are non-overlapping, one has that overall inequality as measured with the 
Gini index (G) can be written as G = GB+GW. 
FW
IP
The indices presented in the previous section gave way to a number of extensions and 
generalizations aiming to improve some of the former deficiencies. As noted in 
Chakravarty and Majumder (2001) and Chakravarty et al (2007), the indices shown in 
equations [1]-[4] are purely descriptive regarding the distribution of incomes around the 
median but they were derived without making any use of welfare concepts. For this 
reason, these authors suggested using relative and absolute indices of bipolarization 
using explicit forms of social welfare functions. The relative index proposed by 
Chakravarty and Majumder (2001) can be written as follows: 
)(
2
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m
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µµµµ    [5] 
where B(m) and H(m) are chosen so that the bipolarization axioms are satisfied and 
)( UyI  (resp. )( LyI ) is the value of an inequality index for the numbers in the vector yU 
(resp. yL). Equation [5] generalizes the Foster-Wolfson index by using other indices of 
inequality rather than the original Gini (in fact, whenever I is the Gini index, equation 
[5] essentially reduces to the Foster-Wolfson bipolarization index shown in equations 
[1], [2]). When alternative inequality formulations like the Atkinson or the Theil indices 
are chosen, the corresponding polarization index satisfies other ethical principles the 
decision-maker might be interested in. In a very similar fashion, Chakravarty et al 
(2007) proposed the following index: 
)(~
2
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µµµµ   [6] 
where )(~ mB  and )(~ mH  serve the same purpose as the B(m) and H(m) in equation [5]. 
Clearly, [6] is the absolute version of [5]: it can also be interpreted as a generalization of 
the absolute version of the Foster-Wolfson index. 
Also inspired in the Foster-Wolfson index, Rodriguez and Salas (2003) proposed the so-
called extended Wolfson bi-polarization measure as 
 
 
PI
RS = GB (v) − GW (v)   [7] 
where GB(v) (resp. GW(v)) is the between group (resp. within group) component 
associated with the Donaldson and Weymark (1980) extended Gini inequality index2 
assuming that the population is bi-partitioned across the median. In order to satisfy the 
Increased Bipolarity axiom, Rodriguez and Salas (2003) show that parameter v must lie 
somewhere in the interval [2, 3]. The idea of defining bipolarization as the difference of 
between-group and within-group inequality when the population is split in two across 
the median income was also present in the index proposed by Silber et al. (2007): 
                                                          
2In its continuous version, the extended Gini inequality index is defined as 
∫ −−−−=
1
0
2 )()1()1(1)( dqqLqvvvG v , where v is an inequality aversion parameter such that v>1 
and L is the Lorenz curve. 
 PI
SDH = GB − GW( ) G    [8] 
Following the same basic idea, bipolarization has also been defined as 
 
PI
ZKG = GB GW    [9] 
Clearly, equation [9] can be seen as a ‘multiplicative’ version of equations [7] and [8] 
(i.e.: rather than using the difference in between-group and within-group inequalities 
one uses their ratio). Equation [9] is very similar to the hybrid polarization measure 
proposed by Zhang and Kanbur (2001) and presented in equation [41]. The similarity 
between equations [2], [7], [8] and [9] is clear. As is clear from equation [9], such 
polarization index can be problematic when there is no within group inequality. In this 
respect, it is easy to show that 
 
PI
SDH = PI
ZKG −1( ) PIZKG +1( ), so this measure avoids the 
eventual problem of zero denominators. An axiomatic characterization of a broad class 
of bipolarization indices can be found in Bossert and Schworm (2008). 
Recently, Chakravarty (2009:117) proposed the following bipolarization indices: 
 
PI
Cε =
1
N
ni | m − yi |
ε
i=1
k
∑
 
 
 
 
 
 
1/ε
m
, 0 < ε <1   [10] 
εC
IP is the ratio between the generalized mean of order ε of deviations of individual 
incomes from the median and the median. The absolute version of equation [10] is 
given by 
 
PI
Caε =
1
N
ni | m − yi |
ε
i=1
k
∑
 
 
 
 
 
 
1/ε
= mPI
Cε , 0 < ε <1   [11] 
While not being exactly the same, the indices εCIP  and 
εaC
IP  are reminiscent of the 
bipolarization indices proposed by Wang and Tsui (2000) in equations [3] and [4]. 
 
2.2. Polarization orderings 
As is well-known, different bipolarization indices might rank alternative distributions in 
different directions. In some cases, one might be interested in having a more robust 
procedure to rank distributions that remains unchanged when choosing all possible 
indices belonging to a particular class. This partial ordering approach will be reviewed 
in this section, in which we assume that the population weights ni=1 for all i to simplify 
notation and define 
 
N = (N +1) /2. Similarly to the Lorenz curve in the inequality 
framework, different authors have defined polarization curves to rank distributions in 
terms of polarization in a robust manner.  
The first authors to speak about polarization curves were Foster and Wolfson (1992), 
who defined the so-called relative polarization curve. That curve shows the extent to 
which a given distribution is different from the hypothetical situation in which 
everybody has an income equal to the median. The ordinate corresponding to the 
population proportion q/N equals 
 
FWCR (y,q) =
1
N
(m(y) − yi)
m(y)
if 1≤ q ≤ N 
q≤ i≤N 
∑
1
N
(yi − m(y))
m(y)
if N ≤ q ≤ N
N ≤ i≤q
∑
 
 
  
 
 
 
   [12] 
Note that the ordinate at NN /  involves the income level m(y). Whenever q is not an 
integer, the corresponding ordinate is obtained via linear interpolation (see Chakravarty 
2009 for details). For a typical income distribution, FWCR is decreasing up to NN / , at 
NN /
 
the curve coincides with the horizontal axis and then it increases monotonically 
(see Figure 3). In case of an equal distribution (yi = m for all i), the FWCR curve 
corresponds to a horizontal line passing through the origin. Interestingly, the area under 
FWCR corresponds to the Foster and Wolfson (1992) bipolarization index shown in 
equations [1] and [2]3. 
[[[Figure 3 around here]]] 
 
 
Figure 3. An illustration of a relative polarization curve. 
 
                                                          
3 In that paper, the polarization curve was introduced first and the Foster-Wolfson polarization index was 
defined after it. 
The FWCR curve allows introducing the definition of dominance criteria. For any two 
income distributions x, y, we say that ‘x relative FW dominates y’ (written as yx
RFW
≥ ) 
if and only if FWCR (x, q) ≥ FWCR (y, q) for all q },,1{ N∈  and the strict inequality 
holds at least once. The next one is the kind of result a polarization ordering approach 
aims to establish: 
Theorem 1 (Chakravarty 2009): Let x, y be a couple of arbitrary income distributions. 
Then, the following conditions are equivalent: (i) yx
RFW
≥ ; (ii) PI(x)>PI(y) for all 
relative bipolarization indices that satisfy Increased Spread, Increased Bipolarity and 
Symmetry. 
Extensions 
The notion of relative polarization curve (FWCR) can be extended in several directions. 
The easiest one is to consider an absolute polarization curve, which is simply obtained 
from FWCR scaling up by the median. This is the approach followed by Chakravarty et 
al (2007). According to that paper, one has that: (i) the area under the absolute 
polarization curve corresponds to the absolute version of the Foster and Wolfson index 
FW
IP ; (ii) Theorem 1 can be restated simply using absolute bipolarization indices. 
As is known, relative polarization curves (and the corresponding indices) remain 
unchanged with proportional changes in all incomes and absolute polarization curves 
(and the corresponding indices) remain unchanged if the same amount is added to all 
individual incomes. However, there are intermediate concepts of invariance which have 
been explored in the field of income inequality (see, for instance, Pfingsten 1986). In an 
interesting contribution, Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio (2010) define an intermediate 
polarization curve as 
 
IPC1(y,q,λ) =
1
N
(m(y) − yi)
λm(y) +1− λ
if 1≤ q ≤ N 
q≤ i≤N 
∑
1
N
(yi − m(y))
λm(y) +1− λ
if N ≤ q ≤ N
N ≤ i≤q
∑
 
 
  
 
 
 
   [13] 
where λ is a real parameter between 0 and 1. Clearly, when λ = 1, IPC1 corresponds to 
the relative polarization curve (FWCR) and when λ = 0, IPC1 corresponds to the absolute 
polarization curve. Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio (2010) show that: (i) the area under 
IPC1 is another bipolarization index (called intermediate polarization index); (ii) 
Theorem 1 can be generalized for the case of intermediate polarization indices. 
In this line, Lasso et al (2010) propose other notions of intermediateness. In particular, 
they propose the following generalization of the intermediate polarization curve shown 
in equation [13]: 
 IPC2(y,q,λ,ε) =
1
N
(m(y) − yi)
λm(y) +1− λ( )ε
if 1 ≤ q ≤ N 
q≤ i≤N 
∑
1
N
(yi − m(y))
λm(y) +1− λ( )ε
if N ≤ q ≤ N
N ≤ i≤q
∑
 
 
  
 
 
 
   [14] 
Clearly, when ε = 1, IPC2 corresponds to IPC1. This family of curves comes from the 
adoption of the Krtscha-type notion of intermediateness (Krtscha 1994). In turn, Lasso 
et al (2010) also show that the area under IPC2 corresponds to a Krtscha-type 
intermediate polarization index and elaborate the corresponding version of Theorem 1 
for Krtscha-type intermediate bipolarization indices. Interestingly, Lasso et al (2010) 
also show the conditions under which their intermediate bipolarization indices satisfy 
the ‘polarization version’ of the Unit Consistency4 axiom proposed by Zheng in the 
context of inequality and poverty measurement. That axiom is not satisfied by the 
intermediate polarization indices proposed by Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio (2010). 
Lastly, Duclos and Echevin (2005) introduce simple dominance tests for income 
distributions. Defining 
 
dy (i) = 1− yi /m  and 
 
Qy (λ) = N
−1 I(dy (i) ≥
i=1
N
∑ λ)–where I(.) is an 
indicator function that takes the value of 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise–the 
authors suggest that a reasonable way to test bipolarization dominance between any two 
income distributions x, y is to compare the relative position of the curves Qx(λ) and 
Qy(λ) for all λ>0 (see Duclos and Echevin 2005 for details). Recall that Qy(λ) gives the 
proportion of the population whose proportional distance from the median exceeds λ.  
 
2.3. Income multipolar indices 
The different bipolarization measures presented in the previous sections were 
constructed under the assumption that a society is split into two-equal sized groups: the 
‘poor’ and the ‘rich’ (i.e.: those below and above the median income). However, this is 
just one possible partition and one might wonder what happens when alternative 
grouping of the population are proposed. This intuition has lead to the creation of other 
polarization indices that will be investigated in this section. 
 
In a fundamental contribution, Esteban and Ray (1994) proposed a polarization measure 
(henceforth ER) that attempted to measure the extent to which an income distribution is 
clustered around an arbitrary number of poles. For that purpose, the authors presented 
the so-called Identification-Alienation approach (IA). According to IA, polarization can 
be assumed to be equal to the sum of all possible effective antagonisms existing in a 
given society, which in turn depend on individuals’ sense of identification and 
alienation. On the one hand, individuals are assumed to feel identified with other 
individuals that are ‘similar’ to themselves. On the other hand, individuals are assumed 
                                                          
4 A bipolarization measure PI is unit consistent if for any distributions x, y such that PI (x) < PI(y), then    
PI(θx) < PI(θy) for any θ > 0. 
to feel alienated vis-à-vis other individuals that are ‘very different’. More specifically, 
Esteban and Ray (1994) posit that the interpersonal antagonism T(i,a) of a person with 
an income level x with respect to one with an income level y is the result of her own 
sense of identity i – which depends on the group size ni – and of the interpersonal 
alienation a – which is assumed to depend on the income distance xy − . Moreover, it 
is assumed that T is some function increasing in its second argument with T(0,a) = 
T(i,0) = 0. Therefore, the IA approach is summarized in the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis: Polarization in a given society is postulated to be the sum of all effective 
antagonisms:  
( )∑∑ −=
i j
jiijiI yynTnnynP ,),(    [15] 
This assumption is a bit of a black box and some extra work is necessary to derive it 
from other – much weaker – axioms. Be that as it may, Esteban and Ray (1994) 
proposed the following three axioms to pin down an explicit functional form for 
equation [15] so that it could be implemented empirically5. All the three axioms are 
based on an income distribution constituted by three different values y1 = 0 <  y2 <  y3 
and the corresponding population masses n1, n2 and n3. 
Axiom ER1: Let n1 > n2 = n3 >0. Fix n1 > 0 and y2 > 0. There exists c1 > 0 and c2 > 0 
(possibly depending on n1 and y2) such that if 132 cyy <−  and n2 < c2n1, then joining of 
the masses n2 and n3 at their mid-point (y2+ y3)/2 increases polarization. 
Axiom ER2: Let n1, n2, n3>0, n1 > n3 and 232 yyy <− . There exists c3>0 such that if n2 
is moved to the right towards n3 by an amount not exceeding c3, polarization increases. 
Axiom ER3: Let n1, n2, n3 > 0, n1 = n3 and y2 = y3- y2 = c4. Any new distribution formed 
by shifting population mass from the central mass n2 equally to the two lateral masses n1 
and n3, each c4 units of distance away, must increase polarization. 
Imposing axioms ER1, ER2 and ER3 to the functional form of equation [15], Esteban 
and Ray (1994) derived the following polarization index:  
∑∑ −= +
i j
jiji
ER
I yynncynP
α1),(    [16] 
where c>0 is a proportionality constant and ]6.1,0(∈α . Recall that when 0=α , ERIP  
corresponds to the (absolute) Gini index. Therefore, α is usually interpreted as a 
polarization sensitivity parameter: the greater the value of α, the greater the difference 
between inequality and polarization. Interestingly, the maximum possible value of ERIP  
is attained when the population is split in two equal sized income groups, and is 
                                                          
5 The formulation of these axioms is taken from Chakravarty (2009), who in turn adapted them from 
Esteban and Ray (1994). 
minimal when all population is concentrated on a single income group. In another 
contribution, Esteban and Ray (1999) show that polarization indices like the one shown 
in equation [16] arise naturally in behavioral models that link the level and pattern of 
social conflict to the society-wide distribution of individual characteristics. 
Variants and extensions 
The polarization index suggested by Esteban and Ray (1994) has been generalized in a 
number of directions that attempt to overcome some of its shortcomings. One of the 
problems with the ER framework is that in most real world cases, income distributions 
are modeled using continuous distributions rather than with a discrete list of income 
values {y1,…,yk}. In this line, Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) proposed an 
axiomatically characterized continuous version of the ER index, which will be referred 
to as DER. In order to characterize the new index, Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) 
introduced the notion of basic densities, that is: un-normalized, symmetric, unimodal 
densities with compact support. Those basic densities are used to model income 
distributions. The axioms used in that paper are listed below. 
Axiom DER1: If a distribution is composed of a single basic density, then a squeeze6 of 
that density cannot increase polarization. 
After squeezing a basic density, this one is more concentrated towards the mean and the 
distribution is more homogeneous (see Figure 4), so it seems natural to expect that 
polarization should reduce in such case. 
[[[Figure 4 around here]]] 
 
Figure 4. An illustration of a single squeeze. 
                                                          
6 Technically speaking, a 
 
λ -squeeze of a basic density f is the following mean-preserving reduction in the 
spread of f: 
 
f λ(x) ≡ (1 λ) f x − (1− λ)µ λ( ), where 
 
µ is the mean of f. 
Axiom DER2: If a symmetric distribution is composed of three basic densities with 
mutually disjoint supports, then a symmetric squeeze of the side densities cannot reduce 
polarization. 
This is the basic axiom that makes polarization essentially different from inequality 
measurement. Since the squeezes of the side densities are accomplished via Pigou-
Dalton progressive transfers, virtually all inequality measures would reduce, while 
polarization goes in the opposite direction because more cohesive antagonistic groups 
are formed after the transfers (see Figure 5). 
[[[Figure 5 around here]]] 
 
 
 
Figure 5. An illustration of a double squeeze. 
Axiom DER3: Consider a symmetric distribution composed of four basic densities with 
mutually disjoint supports, as in Figure 6. Slide the two middle densities to the side as 
shown (keeping all supports disjoint). Then polarization must increase. 
After the slides of the two middle densities to the corresponding sides, it looks as if two 
more cohesive and antagonistic groups emerged from the distribution: the first 
corresponding to the two densities to the right and the second to the two densities to the 
left. Since these changes depart from a uniform-like distribution and approach the 
bipolar case, it is expected that polarization should increase. 
[[[Figure 6 around here]]] 
 
 
 Figure 6. An illustration of a symmetric outward slide. 
In a well-known result, Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004:1744) prove that a polarization 
index defined in the IA framework satisfies axioms DER1, DER2, DER3 and a 
continuous version of the population principle if and only if it is proportional to 
∫ ∫ −≡ + dxdyyxyfxfP DERI ||)()(1 α    [17] 
In this formula, f(x) is the density function corresponding to the original income 
distribution and 
 
α ∈ [0.25,1]. As before, when 0=α , DERIP  corresponds to the 
continuous version of the Gini index, so α can be treated as a polarization sensitivity 
parameter: the larger its values, the greater the difference between polarization and 
inequality. In order to facilitate the empirical implementation of DERIP , Abdelkrim and 
Duclos (2007) have introduced a polarization module in their distributive analysis 
software DASP (‘Distributive Analysis  Stata Package’) which can be freely 
downloaded from http://dasp.ecn.ulaval.ca. In an interesting contribution, Esteban and 
Ray (2012) discuss the axiomatic characterization of DER and compare it with other 
characterizations presented in the literature for other well-known measures like the 
Foster and Wolfson (1992) and the Wang and Tsui (2000) indices shown in equations 
[1] to [4]. 
Another criticism directed against the ER and DER indices is that individuals are 
assumed to feel identified only with other individuals with exactly the same income 
level. However, it has been argued that such identification might also exist when the 
differences in individuals’ incomes are relatively ‘small’. In order to put into practice 
this idea, Esteban et al (2007) proposed a statistical approach that can be summarized as 
follows. Given an income distribution modeled by a density function f(x), an n-spike 
representation of f is a collection ρ of numbers (y0, y1,…,yn; π1,…, πn; μ1,…, μn) such 
that y0<…<yn and 
∫
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for all i = 1,…,n. Each n-spike representation ρ of f induces an approximation error, 
which in Esteban et al (2007) is defined as 
 
ε( f ,ρ) = 1
2
| x − z | f (x) f (z)dxdz
yi−1
yi
∫
yi−1
yi
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∑    [20] 
Esteban et al (2007) propose to work with the n-spike representation that minimizes this 
error, which is denoted by ρ*. With that representation, the polarization index they 
propose can be written as follows: 
),(),(),,( ∗∗ −= ρβεραβα fERfP EGRI    [21] 
where *),( ραER  and *),( ρε f  are the ER index and error terms associated to ρ*; α is 
the polarization sensitivity parameter and β is a free parameter which measures the 
weight we attach to the ‘measurement error’. The income polarization index shown in 
equation [21] is commonly referred to as the Esteban-Gradín-Ray (EGR) index. Clearly, 
when β = 0 EGR reduces to ER. Interestingly, for the special case where there are only 
two groups (n = 2) and α = β = 1, one has that 
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That is: the Foster and Wolfson (1992) index of bipolarization can be seen as a 
particular case of the EGR index. This approach has the virtue of casting both measures 
– each of which derived from a completely different perspective – in the context of a 
statistically unified framework. Again, the EGR index can be implemented empirically 
using the software package DASP implemented by Abdelkrim and Duclos (2007). 
Assuming that the income distribution is partitioned into different groups, Lasso de la 
Vega and Urrutia (2006) have proposed a variant of the EGR index that can be written 
as follows:  
 
PI
LU = π i
1+απ j 1− Gi( )
θ yi − y j
j
∑
i
∑    [23] 
 
In this equation, Gi stands out as the Gini index for group i and θ ≥ 0 is a constant 
representing the sensitivity towards group cohesion. Introducing the term (1– Gi)θ, the 
LU
IP index is also sensitive to within group dispersion. 
 
3. Social Polarization 
It has been argued that social tension might arise not only because of particular 
characteristics of the income distribution, but by other salient characteristics like 
ethnicity or religiosity. In this respect, several researchers have attempted to measure 
polarization on the basis of alternative groupings of the population (typically based on 
ethnic or religious lines) that do not depend exclusively on the distribution of income or 
wealth. These constructs will be referred to as ‘social polarization measures’. One of the 
most well-known examples of a social polarization index was introduced by Reynal-
Querol (2002) and is defined as  
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where we assume there are k exogenously given groups with population shares πi. 
According to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002), the RQ index satisfies the following 
basic properties: 
Property 1: If there are three groups with shares π1, π2 and π3, and π1>π2≥π3, then if we 
merge the two smallest groups into a new group, the new distribution is more polarized 
than the original one.  
Property 2: Suppose there are two groups with shares π1, π2. Take one of the groups 
and split it into g≥2 groups in such a way that 1,2~~11 +=∀≥= gii πππ , with strict 
inequality for at least one i, where π~  is the new vector of population shares. Then 
polarization under π~  is smaller than under π. 
Property 3: Assume there are three groups with shares π1, π2 and π3 = π1. Then, if we 
shift mass from the second group equally to the other two groups, polarization 
increases. 
These properties are reminiscent of the different axioms used to characterize the income 
polarization index ERIP . It should be noted that RQ takes its maximal value of 1 when a 
population is split in two equal-sized groups (the bipolar case) and it takes its minimal 
value of 0 when there is only a single group. As a matter of fact, the original purpose of 
the index was to capture how far the distribution of the different groups is from the 
(1/2,0,…,0,1/2) bipolar distribution, so RQ can be interpreted as an index measuring 
‘how bipolar’ a given population distribution is. In this respect, RQ differs substantially 
from other well-known heterogeneity measures that have been widely used in the 
literature, like the Fractionalization index shown below. 
 
FRAC =1− π i
2
i=1
k
∑ = π i(1− π i)
i=1
k
∑   [25] 
As is known, FRAC should be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals do not belong to the same group. Keeping all else constant, when we 
increase arbitrarily the number of groups (k), RQ will decrease but FRAC will increase, 
so the two measures are fundamentally different. 
Axiomatic characterization of RQ 
In its original formulation, the RQ index was not axiomatically characterized (observe 
that RQ satisfies properties 1, 2 and 3, but these do not characterize the index 
univocally). In an attempt to fill this gap, Chakravarty and Maharaj (2011) characterized 
axiomatically RQ, a useful exercise that is important to fully understand the normative 
foundations upon which an index is based. In that paper, the authors posit that a social 
polarization index has to be of the following form:
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where ψ:[0,1]→R is a continuous function called ‘influence function’ and ψ(πi) is 
assumed to represent the impact of group i on overall polarization. In this context, 
Chakravarty and Maharaj (2011) propose the following axioms. 
Axiom S1: For all k and all π =(π1,…, πk), 10 ≤≤ CMSP . 
Axiom S2: For all k, 0)( =πCMSP if π is some permutation of (1,0,…,0). 
Axiom S3: For all k, 1)( =πCMSP if π is some permutation of (1/2,1/2,0,…,0). 
Axiom S4: Consider the distribution π = (π1,…,πk) and the distribution                  
π’=((π1 + π2)/2, (π1 + π2)/2, π3,…, πk). Then the polarization difference 
 
PS
CM (π ) − PS
CM ( ′ π )can be expressed as 
 
PS
CM (π ) − PS
CM ( ′ π ) = (π1 − π 2)
2 f (π1 + π 2)   [27] 
where f:[0,1]→R is a continuous function. 
Axiom S5: )/1,,/1( kkPCMS  becomes arbitrarily small for sufficiently large k. 
All these axioms – which are named with the letter ‘S’ standing for ‘social’ – are quite 
clear and simple (except perhaps for axiom S4, which might not look as intuitive as the 
other ones). With them, the following result can be presented. 
Theorem 2 (Chakravarty and Maharaj 2011): Let CMSP
 
be a function as in [26] for 
which the influence function ψ is twice continuously differentiable. Then the following 
statements are equivalent: 
(i) CMSP
 
satisfies axioms S1, S2, S3, S4 and Property 1. 
(ii) CMSP
 
satisfies axioms S1, S2, S3, S4 and Property 2. 
(iii) CMSP
 
satisfies axioms S2, S3, S4 and Property 3. 
(iv) CMSP
 
satisfies axioms S2, S3, S4 and S5. 
(v) CMSP
 
is precisely the index RQ. 
Moreover, Chakravarty and Maharaj (2011) also show that the different sets of axioms 
are independent (see their Theorem 7).  
Variants and Extensions  
One of the greatest advantages of the RQ index is its simplicity: its values can be easily 
calculated simply knowing the population shares of the subgroups π1,…, πk. In turn, this 
leaves room for a significant number of extensions in alternative directions. For 
instance, Chakravarty and Maharaj (2012) have recently proposed the so-called 
‘Generalized RQ-index of order θ’, which is defined as: 
 
RQθ = 4 π i
2(1− π i)
i=1
k
∑ + θ π i1π i2π i3
1≤ i1 < i2 < i3 ≤k
∑   [28] 
where θ∈[0,3] and k≥3. The first term appearing in equation [28] gives a multiple of the 
probability that out of three randomly selected individuals, two will belong to a single 
group and the third to another one. The second term gives a multiple of the probability 
that all three individuals belong to three different groups. Since RQθ is a linear 
combination of both probabilities, its values can be interpreted as an extent of 
heterogeneity of a population partitioned in k groups. Clearly, when θ = 0, RQθ  reduces 
to RQ. 
In Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002), the RQ index is presented as a particular case 
of the so-called ‘discrete polarization index’ 
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It is trivial to show that RQP DPS =)4,1( . This equation bears a lot of resemblance to the 
ER income polarization index shown in equation [16]. Rather than using the term 
ji yy −  for measuring distance between groups, equation [29] uses a discrete metric 
that takes a value of 1 when two individuals belong to different groups and 0 otherwise.  
It can be argued that the discrete distance measure might be too crude to capture 
appropriately the existing distances between alternative social groups. In this respect, 
Permanyer (2012) proposes to greatly enrich such distance measure in the following 
way. Firstly, it is postulated that social polarization is greatly influenced by the extent to 
which different individuals feel identified with the group to which they belong. The 
intensity with which individuals feel to belong to their particular group is called 
radicalism degree, and it is measured with a real number x (x ∈ R+). For each 
population group i there is an un-normalized density function fi(x) that measures the 
way in which radicalism degrees are distributed therein. We denote by f =(f1(x),…, fk(x)) 
the collection of the k density functions. In order to operationalize the IA approach, it is 
postulated that an individual belonging to group i with radicalism degree x has a feeling 
of identification proportional to fi(x). Regarding alienation, two different assumptions 
are made: one of them posits that alienation can only be felt between members of 
different groups7 (assumption A1) and the second one states that alienation can also be 
felt between members of the same group8 (assumption A2). Under assumption A1, 
Permanyer (2012) axiomatically characterizes the following social polarization index: 
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P1( f ) = π i
1+απ j (
j≠ i
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∑ µi + µ j )    [30] 
where 
 
µi is the mean of radicalism degrees’ density function fi(x) and α∈(0,1]. As 
usual, α is interpreted as a polarization sensitivity parameter. Recall this measure can be 
seen as a generalization of the discrete social polarization measure ),( θαDPSP  shown in 
equation [29]: the absence of an alienation component has been substituted by a much 
richer structure that is sensitive to individuals’ radicalism distributions in equation [30]. 
Clearly, if ),(, 1 θαµµ DPS
P
Sji PPji ≡≠∀= . Interestingly, [30] also bears some 
resemblance with equation [42] (see below), the difference being that in equation [30] 
one deals with radicalism degrees distributions while in equation [42] one deals with 
income distributions. 
 
Since one could argue that alienation might operate not only between individuals of 
different groups but also between individuals of the same group (assumption A2), 
Permanyer (2012) also characterizes axiomatically the following index: 
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P 2( f ) = fi
1+α (x) fi(y) | x − y | dxdy∫∫
i=1
k
∑ + f i1+α (x) f j (y)(x + y)dxdy∫∫
j≠ i
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k
∑   [31] 
where the polarization sensitivity parameter α  is bounded between 1/2 and 1. This 
formulation bears some resemblance with the income polarization index DER shown in 
equation [17]. As before, however, equation [31] is based on radicalism degrees 
distributions but equation [17] is based on income distributions.  
The main challenge when attempting to implement empirically the polarization indices 
shown in equations [30] and [31] is to measure radicalism degrees and their distribution 
fi(x). In the empirical application shown in Permanyer (2012), religious radicalism 
degree is proxied applying Principal Components Analysis to a set of attitudinal 
questions regarding religiosity. In order to facilitate the computation of equations [30] 
and [31], Abdelkrim and Duclos (2007) have implemented a specific module in the 
software package DASP. 
Polarization measures on the basis of ordinal information 
                                                          
7 In case radicalism degrees of different individuals from different groups equal x and y, their alienation is 
assumed to be x+y.  
8 In case radicalism degrees of different individuals from the same group equal x and y, their alienation is 
assumed to be |x-y|. 
So far, the polarization indices shown in this chapter have been computed on the basis 
of cardinal or categorical data. In the former category we can find the income 
polarization indices of section 2 plus the social polarization indices shown in equations 
[30]-[31]. In the latter category we can find the other social polarization indices. 
However, in many circumstances important dimensions might be coded with ordinal 
variables (a typical example is that of health, which in many circumstances is measured 
via respondents’ self-assessments in an ordinal scale). Interestingly, other socio-
economic indices have recently made room for ordinal variables as well, for instance in 
the field of inequality or multidimensional poverty measurement (e.g.: Allison and 
Foster 2004, Alkire and Foster 2011 among many others).  
In this subsection we will show a couple of polarization measures that are meant to be 
used with ordinal information. Before that, we introduce some basic notation. The 
number of categories will be denoted by k, and the number of individuals in category ‘i’ 
by ni. As before, let ∑ ==
k
i iii
nn
1
π . For each category },,1{ kc ∈  we define 
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π . In an original contribution, Apouey (2007) presented 
the following polarization indices on the basis of ordinal data: 














−
−
−




= ∑
−
=
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
k
c k
c
k
kA
S N
NN
k
NP
ββ
θ    [32] 
∑
−
=
−Π
−
−=
1
1
2
2
1
1
21
k
c
c
A
S k
P
ββ
   [33] 
where θ is a strictly positive constant and β
 
∈(0,1). In equation [32], θ is a 
proportionality constant that can be used to normalize the values of the index into the 
desired range. In equations [32] and [33], parameter β reflects the importance that is 
given to the median category. When β→0 (resp. β→1), the relative contribution of the 
median category increases (resp. decreases) whereas the relative contribution of the 
other categories decrease (resp. increase). 
The ordinal polarization indices shown in equations [32] and [33] are inspired in Wang 
and Tsui (2000) cardinal bipolarization measures (see equations [3] and [4]). That is, it 
is assumed that the population is divided in two subgroups: those below the median and 
those above it. In this respect, the polarization indices 21 , AS
A
S PP  are meant to satisfy the 
ordinal version of the axioms of Increased Spread and Increased Bipolarity (see Apouey 
2007 for details). Essentially, both 1ASP  and 
2A
SP  measure how far a given distribution is 
from the extreme bipolar case where half the population is concentrated in the lower end 
of the distribution and the other half in the upper extreme. Therefore, both measures are 
maximized in the bipolar case and minimized in the case where all population is 
concentrated in a single category. This property is shared with all income bipolarization 
measures shown in section 2.1 and with the RQ index. 
In a recent contribution, D’Ambrosio and Permanyer (2012) presented a new class of 
social polarization indices meant for those cases where an attribute of interest (e.g.: 
health, happiness or degree of satisfaction) is measured in an ordinal scale and the 
population is assumed to be partitioned in exogenously given groups g1,…,gk (e.g.: 
along ethnic, religious or other lines). In that paper, the authors use the IA approach, so 
polarization is assumed to be proportional to the sum of all effective antagonisms in the 
population. As is usual, individuals’ identification is assumed to be proportional to the 
size of the group to which they belong. Regarding alienation, the authors propose two 
different alternatives: symmetric and asymmetric alienation. For symmetric alienation 
between groups gi, gj, the ‘discrete overlap coefficient’ has been proposed:  
∑
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Where cgip ,  is the share of group gi in category c. This coefficient lies between 0 
(disjoint groups) and 1 (perfectly-overlapping groups). Alienation is then defined as 
ijθ−1 , taking the value 0 when the groups overlap completely and 1 when the groups 
are completely disjoint. The greater the degree of overlap, the more similar the groups 
are, and hence the less the degree of alienation between them. Alternatively, it has been 
argued that feelings of alienation between groups should not necessarily be reciprocal. 
Consider, say, a comparison between a poor and a rich individual: while the poor person 
might have reason to feel animosity towards the rich person, the opposite might not hold 
necessarily. In this context, alienation between groups ‘i’ and ‘j’ can be defined as a 
function of: 
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where 
 
δst  equals 1 if individual ‘i’ from group i is ranked below individual ‘t’ from 
group j and 0 otherwise. This procedure yields an asymmetric function (Aij≠Aji), 
consistent with the alienation felt from underprivileged towards more privileged groups 
not necessarily being reciprocated (this contrasts with traditional income-polarization 
measures, where alienation is always symmetric). The value of Aij measures the extent 
to which group gi is underprivileged with respect to group gj. When Aij = 1, all of the 
members of group gi are ranked below any member of group gj with respect to the 
ordinal attribute we take into consideration: this is the case of maximal alienation. At 
the other extreme, Aij = 0 when no member of group gi is ranked below any member of 
group gj, which refers to minimal alienation. 
With these symmetric and asymmetric alienation functions, D’Ambrosio and Permanyer 
(2012) axiomatically characterized the following social polarization measures: 
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where 
 
α ∈ [α∗,1], with α∗ = 2 − log2 3
log2 3−1
≈ 0.71 is the polarization sensitivity parameter. 
Once again, these polarization indices can be seen as generalizations of the polarization 
index ),( θαDPSP  shown in equation [29] where the discrete distance function has been 
substituted by a richer structure that is sensitive to the way in which a given attribute of 
interest is distributed across individuals and groups. 
 
4. Hybrid Polarization measures 
The income polarization measures shown in section 2 describe the extent to which the 
distribution of income is clustered around certain poles. Following a different approach, 
the social polarization indices shown in section 3 basically measure the extent to which 
a population is clustered around certain poles defined on the basis of non-income 
characteristics like race, ethnicity or religion. In this section, we describe other 
polarization indices that lie somewhere in between of the aforementioned intuitions, that 
is: the distribution of a given attribute – typically income – as well as other qualitative 
characteristics play a non-trivial role when defining the groups among which 
polarization is going to be measured. For this reason, this kind of indices will be 
referred to as ‘hybrid’. In this respect, the polarization indices 
 
PS
AP1 and 
 
PS
AP 2  shown in 
equations [36] and [37] could also be considered as hybrid because the distribution of 
an (ordinal) attribute and the existence of exogenously given groups are relevant when 
defining the alienation component.  
Zhang and Kanbur (2001) defined a simple and intuitive hybrid index of polarization on 
the basis of the Generalized Entropy (GE) index of inequality (Shorrocks 1980). If we 
assume that the population has n members, the index is written as 
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Recall that GE is additively decomposable, that is: if we assume that the population is 
split in k groups, total inequality can be written as the sum of withing group and 
between group inequality. This is generally written as:
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where eg is a vector of ones of length ng, 
 
µg  is the mean of group g, Ig is the internal 
inequality within group g and 
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Taking advantage of this well-known inequality index, Zhang and Kanbur (2001) 
proposed the following hybrid polarization measure:
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This simple index satisfies the most basic intuitions regarding a polarization index, 
namely: it increases with larger between group inequality and it decreases with larger 
within group inequality. It must be emphasized that the income polarization index 
shown in equation [9] is very similar to the index shown in [41]: in the former, it is 
assumed that the population is split in two non-overlapping groups – those above the 
median income and those below it – and the inequality measure that is used is the Gini 
index rather than GE9.  
In an interesting contribution, D’Ambrosio (2001) proposed other hybrid polarization 
measures inspired in the IA approach. Essentially, it is assumed that the population is 
split in k relevant groups, each of which with the corresponding income distribution 
fi(x). With this notation, the D’Ambrosio (2001) hybrid polarization measure can be 
written as 
 
PH
A = π i
1+απ jKovij
j
∑
i
∑    [42] 
where 
 
Kovij =
1
2
fi(y) − f j (y) dy∫
 
is the Kolmogorov measure of variation distance. 
This is a measure of the lack of overlapping between income distributions fi(x) and fj(x). 
Kovij = 0 if fi(x) = fj(x) for all x and Kovij reaches its maximum of 1 when fi(x) and fj(x) 
do not overlap. There is a clear relationship between the Kolmogorov measure of 
                                                          
9 The Gini index is not additively decomposable (i.e.: it does not satisfy equation [39]) in general. 
However, in the particular case where the different groups are non-overlapping, it is possible to write the 
Gini as the sum of between group and within group inequalities. 
variation distance and the overlap coefficient shown in equation [34], which can be 
rewritten in its continuous version as  
 
θij = min{ f i(x), f j (x)}
−∞
∞
∫ dx    [43] 
The statistical properties of the overlap coefficient 
 
θij  and some of its multivariate 
generalizations have been explored in detail by Anderson et al (2009). Other interesting 
hybrid polarization measures have been proposed – albeit not axiomatically 
characterized – in Duclos Esteban and Ray (2004). Following the IA approach, the 
authors consider the case in which notions of identification are mediated not just by 
group membership but also by income similarities as well, while the antagonism 
equation remains untouched. Then they get what one might call social polarization with 
income-mediated identification, which can be written as   
 
PH
DER1 = (1− n j )
j=1
k
∑ f j (x)α dFj (x)
x
∫    [44] 
Duclos Esteban and Ray (2004) also make the assumption that alienation can also be 
income-mediated (for alienation, two individuals must belong to different groups and 
have different incomes). According to the authors, “groups have only a demarcating 
role – they are necessary (but not sufficient) for identity, and they are necessary (but 
not sufficient) for alienation” (Duclos Esteban and Ray 2004, p. 1760). The 
corresponding index would look as follows 
 
PH
DER 2 = f j (x)
α | x − y | dFj (x)dFk (y)
y
∫
x
∫
k≠ j
∑
j=1
k
∑    [45] 
5. Future research lines 
As has been shown in this literature review, the measurement of polarization has 
expanded considerably in the last two decades since the seminal contributions of Foster 
and Wolfson (1994) and Esteban and Ray (1994). However, much works remains to be 
done and we aim to finish this chapter indicating some research lines in polarization 
measurement that deserve to be further explored. 
Among the most promising lines of research in the field of polarization measurement 
we find that of multidimensional polarization. As has been the case with inequality or 
poverty measurement, it is possible to conceive the notion of polarization in a 
multidimensional setting where attributes other than income are taken into account 
when trying to identify clusters and distances between them. In this respect, it is worth 
highlighting that there have already been some initial attempts to produce such 
measures. In an innovative contribution, Gigliarano and Mosler (2009) introduce a 
polarization index defined on the basis of many attributes at the same time. If we denote 
by X an n
 
×k matrix with non-negative entries (n being the number of individuals in the 
society and k the number of attributes that are being taken into account), the authors 
posit that multidimensional polarization should be written as follows: 
 
PM
GM (X) = ς (B(X),W (X),S(X))    [46] 
where B(X) and W(X) are indices that measure between and within group inequality 
respectively, S(X) is an index of relative group size and ς is a function that increases on 
B and S and decreases on W. In other words, the authors construct multivariate 
polarization indices using the between and within decomposition by subgroups of 
certain indices of multivariate inequality. Clearly, this formulation is an attempt to 
generalize the functional forms of the polarization indices shown in equations [2], [7], 
[8], [9] and [41]. In order to be able to obtain meaningful between and within group 
inequality decompositions, Gigliarano and Mosler (2009) use different inequality 
decompositions via Generalized Entropy indices, multivariate extensions of Atkinson’s 
inequality index and Gini decompositions where the supports of the different groups 
have no geometric overlap. To simplify matters, the authors further assume that 
equation [46] must take one of the following forms: 
 
PM
GM 1(X) = φ B(X)
W (X) + c
 
 
 
 
 
 S(X)   [47] 
 
PM
GM 2(X) =ψ B(X) −W (X)( )S(X)   [48] 
 
PM
GM 3(X) = τ B(X)
B(X) + W (X) + c
 
 
 
 
 
 S(X)   [49] 
 
Recall these are quite general functional forms that include relatively similar versions of 
the polarization indices of Foster and Wolfson (1994), Zheng and Kanbur (2001) or 
Silber et al (2007) as particular cases. Interestingly, Gigliarano and Mosler (2009) also 
propose a list of desirable axioms a multidimensional polarization index should satisfy. 
Among these, we highlight a couple of them that are specifically multidimensional: the 
‘between groups correlation increasing majorization property’ and the ‘within groups 
correlation increasing majorization property’. Both of them describe the way in which a 
polarization index should respond under correlation increasing switches among 
attributes10. Despite the interest that these measures have, it is fair to say that 
multidimensional polarization measurement is still in its infancy and much work 
remains to be done. Among other things, the polarization indices shown in [46]-[49] are 
not axiomatically characterized and their structure is somewhat arbitrary. It would be 
interesting to derive other – more general – functional forms from weaker assumptions 
than those imposed in the aforementioned equations. 
                                                          
10 In the multi-attribute welfare literature, a correlation increasing switch is defined as follows. Assume 
we are comparing two individuals i and j in a two-dimensional achievement space associated with 
attributes a and b. Assume also that i has more of a but less of b than j does. If we interchange the 
achievements in attribute b between the two persons, now individual i has more of a and more of b, so 
there has been an increase in the correlation of the attributes. Such change is called a ‘correlation 
increasing switch’. 
 
In this line, another topic that to our knowledge has never been explored before and 
which might be interesting to investigate in the future is the possibility of defining 
multidimensional polarization orderings. The literature of inequality and poverty 
measurement has already introduced the notions of multidimensional inequality and 
multidimensional poverty orderings (e.g.: Duclos, Sahn and Younger 2011, 
Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2008). One might just wonder whether it might be 
possible to generalize the existing ideas on polarization orderings to a multivariate 
setting. 
After reading the existing list of polarization indices, it seems clear that there is room 
for much further improvement in the measurement of polarization on the basis of 
ordinal information. In many cases the variables of interest are not cardinal, particularly 
when they refer to non-income dimensions (e.g.: health or educational attainment). This 
issue has also been highlighted by Alkire and Foster (2011), who argue that in 
multidimensional poverty measurement it is very useful to define indices admitting 
ordinal structures. To date, there are only a couple of measures defined on an ordinal 
basis (see above) and these measures can be expanded in many different directions. In 
particular, it might also be of interest to follow Alkire and Foster’s approach and define 
multidimensional polarization indices that can be constructed with non-cardinal 
variables. 
An important issue that definitely needs to be further explored is the definition of 
appropriate socio-economic distance functions between groups when these are defined 
along a variety of economic or social lines (e.g.: wealth, income, class, race, ethnicity or 
religion). As we have seen in different sections of this chapter, the literature has already 
proposed different ways of approaching this issue but none of them has gained 
widespread adherence. In this respect, we anticipate that the methodology used to 
measure distances in trees (for instance: linguistic trees, see Greenberg 1956, Fearon 
and Laitin 2000, Laitin 2000, Desmet, Ortuño-Ortin and Weber 2009, and Desmet, 
Ortuño-Ortin and Wacziarg 2012) can be useful to generate distance/alienation 
functions between groups. Similarly, we speculate that the ideas behind the construction 
of diversity theories (e.g.: Witzman 1992, 1998, Nehring and Puppe 2002, 2004) can be 
fruitful when attempting to define compelling inter-group distance functions. 
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